Future arrangements for funding higher education by Dearden, Lorraine et al.
 
Future arrangements for funding 
higher education 
 
Lorraine Dearden 
Institute of Education, University of London 
and Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Alissa Goodman 
Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Greg Kaplan 
University of Pennsylvania and Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Gill Wyness 
Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
APRIL 2010 
 
Copyedited by Judith Payne 
 
Acknowledgements 
We gratefully acknowledge funding for this research from the Nuffield 
Foundation and from Universities UK. We would also like to thank members of 
our steering group for this project – in particular, Nicholas Barr, Juliet Chester, 
Paul Clark, Josh Hillman, Anton Muscatelli, and Neil Shephard – for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Despite all their help and suggestions, the usual 
disclaimer applies. The Nuffield Foundation has funded this project, but the 
views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
Foundation. 
 
             
Future arrangements for funding higher education 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
2 
Preface 
The results in this report are based on simulations of the lifetime earnings profiles of 
a particular sample of the population as follows: 
 graduates of first full-time three-year degrees (therefore excluding foundation 
degrees). 
In addition, we focus on a single cohort of graduates as follows:  
 year of entry 2011; 
 year of graduation 2014; 
 graduation at age 22. 
As a result, these results cannot be generalised to the entire student/graduate 
population, and are not directly comparable to official government estimates of the 
cost of the current student support system. Government estimates of the cost of the 
current system are based on a much more heterogeneous sample of 
student/graduate types: 
 undergraduates on all types of courses (degree, foundation degree, PGCE etc.); 
 all types of course lengths (1–7 years); 
 all ages; 
 a range of cohorts (2012–17).  
The government also allows for bankruptcies and death, and makes additional 
assumptions about drop-out rates, migration and loan take-up. 
Furthermore, as will be explained in Section 2, we use a richer model for simulating 
graduate earnings and employment profiles, more closely calibrated to earnings 
levels in the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  
Our model calculates the government subsidy to be 23%, i.e. for every £1 loaned in 
maintenance and fee loans, the government must pay 23p. If we use the 
government earnings profiles for the same cohort, rather than ours, under the same 
assumptions, we get the same mean subsidy of 23p for every £1 loaned. However, 
there are significant differences across the distribution of lifetime earnings in the 
level of subsidies using the two different sets of earnings profiles even though the 
mean subsidy is the same.1 The government figures suggest a subsidy of around 26% 
once differences in degree types, course length, student age, cohorts and take-up 
are taken into account.2 
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Executive summary 
The system of higher education finance in England is currently under formal 
independent review. In this report, we have attempted to highlight some of 
the trade-offs that would be involved in reforming the current system of fees 
and loans applying to full-time undergraduate study. 
All our analysis is based on simulations of the lifetime earnings of a single 
cohort of graduates who are projected to enter full-time undergraduate 
higher education in 2011 and to graduate in 2014 after three years of study, at 
the age of 22 in their first year after graduation. We assume all eligible 
students fully take up their entitlement to loans and fees.  
Our analysis shows, in summary, the following: 
The current system 
 Under the current maintenance and fee loan system, we simulate the 
average taxpayer subsidy to be 23% – in other words, for every £1 loaned 
in the form of maintenance and fee loans, the government must pay 23p. 
Given an average debt level for a graduate of a three-year undergraduate 
degree of £20,900, this amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of £4,800 per 
graduate. The amount of this subsidy varies according to graduate lifetime 
earnings, with the lowest-earning graduates receiving the highest subsidy. 
If some students do not take up loans, then the overall government 
subsidy per student will, by definition, be lower. (Sections 2 and 3) 
Charging a positive real interest rate on loans 
 If the government were to charge an interest rate on loans equal to the 
government’s cost of borrowing (2.2%), this would save the taxpayer 
money. On average, the subsidy would fall from 23p per £1 loaned, to 10p 
per £1 loaned. The remaining subsidy would arise because all student 
debts are written off after 25 years. (Section 4.1) 
 The savings generated from charging this interest rate on loans would be 
highest among graduates in the middle of the graduate lifetime income 
distribution (around the 10th to 30th percentiles for men and the 60th to 
70th for women). This is because these graduates do not benefit from the 
debt write-off subsidy, but hold onto their loans for a longer period, so 
benefit most from the interest subsidy. (Section 4.1) 
 Under our simulations, the break-even interest rate – i.e. the rate the 
government would have to charge in order to have a zero-cost system – is 
around 3.45%. Interest rates higher than this would, assuming graduates 
did not change their repayment behaviour, be profitable to the exchequer. 
(Section 4.1) 
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Raising the tuition fee cap 
 If the government were to raise the fee cap – and provide a fee loan for 
the same amount – this would cost the taxpayer money. This occurs mainly 
because an increasing number of graduates will reach the 25-year 
threshold without having paid off the full value of their loan. Any further 
increase in fees cannot increase the burden of payments to these 
graduates, and instead the taxpayer would effectively have to cover the 
entire additional cost. (Section 4.2) 
 For example, if the average tuition fee rose to £5,000, the average loan 
subsidy would increase from £4,800 per graduate to £6,900 per graduate. 
This cost could be reduced by increasing interest rates in conjunction with 
increasing fees; for example, charging an interest rate of 2.2% would result 
in the subsidy falling to £3,600. (Section 4.2) 
 The interest rate required for the loan system to be revenue-neutral rises 
steeply with the level of the fee. For example, while the ‘break-even’ real 
interest rate is 3.45% at the current fee level of £3,200, this rises to about 
4% for an average fee level of £5,000 and to around 4.5% for an average 
fee level of £6,000. (Section 4.2)  
Other parameters of the loan system 
 Other parameters of the loan system can also be adjusted to achieve the 
same subsidy as the current system or a lower one, with or without 
increasing interest rates and/or fees. Changes can be made, for example, 
to the repayment rate, the number of years after which debt is written off 
and/or the threshold at which people start repaying. The government 
could use different combinations of these parameters in order to save 
money, or create a revenue-neutral or profitable system. For instance, the 
government could create a zero-cost system by raising the interest rate to 
3.2% and raising the repayment rate to 11%. But it could also create a 
revenue-neutral system by raising the repayment rate to 13% and charging 
a 3% interest rate. There are many other combinations that the 
government could use to alter its costs. We have produced a set of 
indifference curves which can be consulted for this purpose. (Section 4.4 
and Appendix) 
 However, it is vital to consider the distributional consequences for 
different types of graduates when changing these parameters. More 
regressive ways of raising revenue include increasing the repayment rate, 
lowering the repayment threshold and/or increasing the debt write-off 
period beyond 25 years. (Section 4.4) 
  
Future arrangements for funding higher education 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
6 
 More progressive ways that the taxpayer could save money using the 
existing parameters include increasing the interest rate in conjunction with 
lowering the loan repayment rate, and/or making graduates pay for a 
further period of time after they have paid off the full balance of their 
loans. (Section 4.4) 
 For example, a zero-subsidy system could be achieved by imposing a 5% 
real interest rate and a 5.8% repayment rate, and this would give the 
biggest taxpayer subsidy to the lowest graduate earners. However, this 
would only result in a zero overall subsidy on the assumption that the 
highest-earning graduates do not choose to pay off their loans faster than 
dictated by the income-contingent repayment schedule (which would save 
them money and cost the government money). (Section 4.4) 
 Another strategy could be to compulsorily extend the length of the 
repayment period for a further two years after graduates have paid off 
their loans – while still preserving the 25-year debt write-off period. This 
could offset some of the effects of early repayment by high-earning 
graduates and is also quite progressive. (Section 4.4)  
 Alternatively, the government could choose to introduce new features to 
the current system in order to save money. One such example is to offer 
students a discount for up-front payment of fees or early repayment of 
their loans. In order for such a system to be profitable for the exchequer, 
however, graduates who would actually lose out financially by taking up 
the discount would need to be induced to do so. (Section 4.5)  
Increasing graduate contributions 
 All of the reforms considered in this report involve transfers of money 
between the private sector (students and graduates), the public sector 
(taxpayers) and universities. While many scenarios we have considered 
actually involve an increase in costs to the taxpayer, those that save the 
taxpayer money increase the cost of going to university for private 
individuals. (Section 5)  
Behavioural changes in response to reforms 
 Increasing the cost of attending university may result in important 
behavioural change consequences. These could take the form of graduates 
making overpayments to reduce their debt or students declining to take up 
loans, or indeed deciding not to participate in university at all. It is 
essential that policymakers are aware of all these possible changes when 
they consider different reforms. (Section 4.3)  
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1. Introduction 
The subject of how to finance higher education (HE) has been debated for 
many years, most recently upon the introduction of top-up fees of up to 
£3,000 (in 2006 prices – or around £3,200 in 2011 prices) per year for students 
starting full-time undergraduate degree courses in 2006. A key promise made 
by the Labour government, as part of the reform package, was to run a 
comprehensive review of the system in 2009 – at which point all full-time 
undergraduate students in the system would be subject to the £3,200 fee cap. 
The review, chaired by Lord Browne, is currently underway and will be taking 
evidence up to May 2010.3  
Lord Browne has been asked to examine three issues: widening university 
participation, affordability of higher education for students and the taxpayer, 
and how to simplify the current system of support. The current system 
consists of means-tested maintenance grants and loans, and universal fee 
loans which cover the full value of the £3,200 fee. Given the current economic 
circumstances, an extremely important issue arising from the review will be 
how to ensure the financial sustainability of the system during a period of 
fiscal constraint. A variety of possible policy changes have been publicly 
debated, and the most widely discussed include increasing the maximum level 
of fees – which, if accompanied by an increase in fee loans alone, would 
involve a rise in the public contribution towards HE – and/or charging a real 
interest rate on maintenance and fee loans – which on its own would reduce 
it.  
In this report, we quantitatively evaluate a number of these scenarios, in 
terms of the impact on costs to the exchequer and of the distributional impact 
on different types of graduate. One important additional contribution we 
make is to try to assess the possible behavioural responses to different types 
of reforms – an issue that is often overlooked when different policy options 
are analysed.  
To help us model the possible impact of alternative reforms, we have 
produced new simulations of the future lifetime earnings profiles of a cohort 
of full-time undergraduate university entrants who will be entering the HE 
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system in 2011. These simulations build on our previous work in this area4 and 
are based on an improved methodology that allows us to take into account 
the likely persistence of earnings and employment shocks, arising, for 
example, from a recession. These earnings profiles allow us to calculate 
graduates’ fee and maintenance loan repayment schedules under a number of 
different reforms, and therefore to assess the change in costs to the 
exchequer of changing HE finance policies, compared with the current system. 
We find that potential reforms have quite different consequences for the 
exchequer and for different types of graduate depending on their position in 
the earnings distribution. Our key findings reveal: 
 Charging an interest rate on loans saves the taxpayer money but generates 
slightly more savings from males and females in the lower to middle parts 
of the lifetime earnings distribution than from the highest-earning 
graduates, since these graduates benefit most from the interest subsidy.  
 Increasing the fee cap (where loans are fully extended to cover the fee) 
costs the taxpayer money, but this cost can be reduced by increasing 
interest rates in conjunction with increasing fees. 
 Other parameters of the loan system can be adjusted to achieve the same 
subsidy as the current system or a lower one – for example, changes can 
be made to the repayment rate, the number of years after which debt is 
written off or the threshold at which people start repaying. We illustrate 
the ways in which different interest rates and repayment rates can be 
combined to produce subsidies as desired – but also, crucially, to change 
the progressivity of the system. 
The structure of this report is as follows. Section 2 briefly sets out how we 
have simulated the lifetime earnings of future graduates, Section 3 describes 
the current system of fee and maintenance loans, the costs to the exchequer 
of this system and the distributional costs of the system according to graduate 
earnings, and Section 4 presents the key findings. Section 5 examines the 
scenarios in a different way, by illustrating the resulting balance of payments 
between public and private contributors. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Simulating the lifetime earnings of future graduates and the 
subsidy per graduate 
2.1 Lifetime earnings simulations 
Our analysis is based on simulations of artificial earnings paths for the cohort 
of full-time undergraduates graduating in 2014. In order to generate these 
simulations, we estimated a rich statistical model for earnings and 
employment dynamics using two large data sets that contain survey 
information on British graduates’ labour market outcomes – the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The statistical 
model generates cross-sectional earnings distributions that are consistent 
with the high-quality cross-sectional data from the LFS. Transitions between 
employment and non-employment, and year-on-year earnings fluctuations, 
are consistent with the dynamics observed in the BHPS. 
We make specific assumptions about future earnings growth and loan take-
up, based on the macroeconomic forecasts contained in the IFS Green Budget 
2010.5 In particular, we assume an economy-wide real earnings growth rate of 
1.8% between 2008 and 2014, followed by a return to the long-run growth 
rate of 2%. This central scenario incorporates a 4.5% reduction in real earnings 
growth relative to trend between mid-2007 and mid-2010. The short-term 
reduction in earnings growth reflects poor labour market conditions 
associated with the current recession. This real earnings growth is in addition 
to expected earnings growth associated with the accumulation of labour 
market experience over these years. We also perform all calculations based on 
a more optimistic, and a more pessimistic, earnings growth scenario. The 
results from these alternative scenarios are presented in the Appendix.  
We assume full take-up of maintenance and fee loans, though it is 
straightforward to calculate the average subsidy under different take-up 
assumptions.6  
2.2 Average student subsidies 
Having access to a set of simulated earnings profiles that reflect the entire 
distribution of graduates’ possible lifetime earnings paths is crucial for 
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assessing the likely impacts of policy changes. Only focusing on specific 
‘example’ graduates or restricting attention to the path of average graduate 
earnings can lead to potentially misleading inferences. This is best seen by 
considering our estimate of the average public subsidy on student loans, 
calculated from the entire distribution of earnings paths. We estimate this 
number to be approximately 23%. However, if one were to focus only on a 
graduate earning average earnings at each age, one would conclude that the 
subsidy is around 18%. The lower subsidy results because the earnings 
distribution is right-skewed, i.e. there are more people concentrated in the 
bottom of the earnings distribution than the top, which means that mean 
earnings for men and women are higher than median earnings (the 
earnings of someone exactly in the middle of the entire male or female 
earnings distribution). Hence, ignoring the full distribution of possible 
earnings paths understates the importance of individuals with low lifetime 
earnings for the overall subsidy. 
Not only does the distribution of lifetime earnings matter, but the timing of 
income receipts during the lifetime matters. To see why, consider an extreme 
example where two graduates have the same total lifetime income, but one 
has high earnings during his/her 20s and 30s, while the other only enters the 
labour force much later, perhaps after having children. In this case, the second 
graduate is far more likely to benefit from the 25-year debt write-off than is 
the first, even though their total lifetime earnings are the same. Our 
simulations take these differences into account, by allowing for all plausible 
paths of earnings over the lifetime. 
It is clear from government sources that our estimates of the subsidy per 
student are lower than government estimates. As described in the Preface, 
they reflect a different modelling approach to simulating future earnings 
paths for graduates as well as a more heterogeneous student population and 
different assumptions about drop-out rates, migration and loan take-up. 
3. The current system 
In September 2006, a new system of HE funding came into operation in 
England. This saw large increases in fees, up to £3,000 (at 2006 prices – £3,200 
at 2011 prices) payable by all graduates of full-time undergraduate degrees. 
Instead of being payable up front, all fees became deferrable until after 
graduation, with loans available at a zero real interest rate, repayable through 
the tax system according to income (at 9% above a threshold of £15,000). A 
zero real interest rate is charged on loans, and all loans are written off after 25 
years. In addition to these arrangements for student support, the taxpayer 
continues to make a significant ongoing contribution to undergraduate 
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teaching through the centrally allocated HEFCE grant. Further details, 
including changes to maintenance loans, are set out in Dearden et al. (2008).7  
The intention behind the reforms was to ensure (i) that a greater share of the 
costs of HE be borne by graduates, the main beneficiaries of HE; (ii) that the 
system include an insurance element to protect graduates against low realised 
returns from HE; and (iii) that universities see increased funding per head. 
Despite the increased contribution by graduates resulting from these reforms, 
a substantial proportion of the private fee revenue still effectively comes from 
the public purse in the form of loan subsidies, which arise both because of the 
zero real interest rate charged on the new fee loans and because of the 
provision for debt write-off after 25 years. 
Figures 1–3 show respectively the present value of debt repayments that 
graduates are expected to make (i.e. net of any subsidies they gain from the 
zero real interest rate and debt write-off), the taxpayer subsidy (expressed as 
a percentage of the original loan) that graduates can expect to receive under 
the current system, and the number of years over which graduates can be 
expected to repay their loans. The charts show how the value of each of these 
differs across the distribution of graduates’ lifetime earnings. In all cases, we 
assume an initial debt level of £20,900 (at 2011 prices), which represents an 
estimate of the average total debt that an undergraduate student will incur 
over a three-year degree course.8,9  
The charts show these key statistics for the whole of our sample, and also for 
males and females separately.  
Note that in order to calculate net present values of debt repayments and the 
value of taxpayer subsidies, we assume a real discount rate of 2.2% per year 
(this follows the government’s present convention for discounting; see DIUS 
Annual Report 2009, annex 1, table 11, for more details). 
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Figure 1. Current system: net present value of graduate repayments 
 
Note: Estimates for males’ and females’ combined lifetime earnings percentiles are based on 
all graduates combined, while for males and for females, lifetime earnings percentiles are 
gender specific, i.e. earners at the 10th percentile of males earn more than those at the 10th 
percentile of females. 
Figure 2. Current system: taxpayer subsidy as a percentage of loan 
 
Note: Estimates for males’ and females’ combined lifetime earnings percentiles are based on 
all graduates combined, while for males and for females, lifetime earnings percentiles are 
gender specific, i.e. earners at the 10th percentile of males earn more than those at the 10th 
percentile of females. 
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Figure 3. Current system: years to repay loan 
 
Note: Estimates for males’ and females’ combined lifetime earnings percentiles are based on 
all graduates combined, while for males and for females, lifetime earnings percentiles are 
gender specific, i.e. earners at the 10th percentile of males earn more than those at the 10th 
percentile of females. 
For a given level of debt on graduation, graduates with lower lifetime earnings 
will eventually repay less of their debt, whilst higher earners will repay more 
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life, but a period of very high earnings towards the end, they may still benefit 
from the 25-year write-off). In fact, there are individuals benefiting from debt 
write-off at up to the 70th percentile for women and the 20th percentile for 
men.  
These results all highlight the fact that the longer the loan is held by a 
graduate, the bigger is the taxpayer contribution to the repayment of that 
loan. This, of course, runs counter to a commonly-held notion that holding 
graduate debt for a long time is an indication of the ‘heavy burden’ of that 
debt. 
4. Key findings 
4.1 Charging a real interest rate on loans 
As described in Section 3, under the current maintenance and fee loan 
system, loans are charged at a zero real rate of interest. In other words, 
graduates only pay interest equal to the rate of inflation. This represents a 
large interest subsidy, since the exchequer itself must pay interest on this 
money. 
One of the most frequently-cited potential policy changes that would save the 
taxpayer money involves removing this interest subsidy and charging a real 
interest rate on loans. 
Figure 4 shows the potential subsidy or profit borne by the exchequer under a 
range of potential real interest rates. All figures are expressed as the subsidy 
per student in total for a three-year course.  
Figure 4. Subsidy/Profit per student at different levels of interest rate 
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Under the current system of zero real interest rates, our estimates suggest 
that the exchequer pays an average subsidy of £4,800 per student. This figure 
comprises two components: the interest subsidy – the cost to the government 
of paying the interest on the loan on behalf of the student – and the write-off 
subsidy – the amount of debt that is left unpaid by each graduate after 25 
years, at which point all debt is written off as a taxpayer loss. 
As Figure 4 also illustrates, as the level of the real interest rate rises, the 
government subsidy falls, and eventually, at an interest rate of around 3.45%, 
the average subsidy per student is zero. Interest rates higher than this result 
in a profit for the government, as, on average, the net present value of 
graduate repayments is greater than the value of their initial debt. Therefore, 
if the exchequer wanted to neutralise the costs of the loan element of the HE 
system, it could do so by charging an interest rate of 3.45%. 
However, while this may be desirable from a savings point of view, charging a 
real interest rate on loans would have important consequences for different 
types of graduates, depending on their lifetime earnings profile. 
To illustrate this, Figure 5 presents the possible distributional consequences of 
charging a real interest rate. It shows the value of the subsidy to graduates at 
different points in the graduate lifetime earnings distribution under the 
current system of zero real interest rates, and if there were a real interest rate 
of 2.2% on student fee and maintenance loans. We have chosen 2.2% as an 
example real interest rate because this is the discount rate used in official 
figures for calculating the government cost of borrowing relating to these 
loans (this is also illustrated in Figure 4). Indeed, this interest rate would make 
the system cost-neutral if there were no provision for debt write-off after a 
fixed period. 
As Figure 5 illustrates, if interest rates were raised to equal the government 
cost of borrowing, then the remaining subsidy would be purely as a result of 
the 25-year debt write-off provision, since there would be no interest subsidy. 
For men, the debt write-off subsidy is relatively low, and only those graduates 
in the bottom 10–20% of the male graduate lifetime earnings distribution 
benefit from this subsidy. As lifetime earnings increase, male graduates do not 
benefit from the write-off subsidy, since they earn sufficient amounts to be 
able to repay their loans in full. However, as Figure 5 illustrates, male 
graduates across the distribution would lose out from a policy that introduced 
a 2.2% real interest rate.  
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Figure 5. Taxpayer subsidy under the current system and a 2.2% interest rate 
 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the resulting savings to the exchequer if the interest 
subsidy were completely removed. Again looking at men, it can be seen that 
this policy would result in average savings to the exchequer from men at all 
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£1 loaned. The savings would amount to £3,200 per male graduate of a full-
time undergraduate degree. 
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Figure 6. Savings resulting from introducing a 2.2% interest rate 
 
 
 
While the savings are fairly uniform across male graduates, slightly more 
savings are generated from male graduates at lower-to-middle points in the 
earnings distribution (around the 10th to 30th percentiles). These graduates 
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lower lifetime earnings, benefit far more from the write-off subsidy. Some 
female graduates up to the 70th percentile of the female graduate lifetime 
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earnings distribution do not fully repay their loans before 25 years and 
therefore benefit from the debt write-off subsidy. Were the interest subsidy 
to be removed, these lower earners would still be financially protected by the 
debt write-off subsidy, but many would lose out from the removal of the 
interest subsidy. The impact of removing the subsidy is slightly more 
progressive for women than for men. The greatest savings would be 
generated from female graduates in the 60th to 70th percentiles of the female 
graduate lifetime earnings distribution. In sum, the average subsidy for each 
female graduate would fall from 27p per £1 of debt to 16p per £1 of debt. The 
savings would amount to an average of £2,300 per female graduate. 
In total (taking men and women together), therefore, raising interest rates to 
2.2% would significantly shift the costs of student loans from the taxpayer to 
graduates. The average subsidy would fall from 23p per £1 of graduate debt to 
only 10p per £1 – a government saving of £2,700 per head. 
As explained previously, the government may instead want to choose an 
interest rate that causes the system to be revenue-neutral. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, an interest rate of around 3.45% should achieve this. Again, there 
would be important distributional consequences to increasing interest rates to 
such a level. 
Figure 7. Subsidy/Profit under a 3.5% interest rate, a 2.2% interest rate and the current 
system 
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zero real interest rates, all graduates receive some subsidy. In a system with a 
2.2% real interest rate, graduates from around the 50th graduate earnings 
percentile and above would receive no subsidy at all; the minimum value of 
the subsidy is zero. At an interest rate of 3.5%, graduates from around the 25th 
percentile of graduate earnings onward actually make a net contribution to 
the exchequer, while those earning below the 25th percentile still receive a 
government subsidy. Overall, this combination of under- and over-payments 
would result in a small overall profit for the exchequer of 0.2p per £1 loaned 
(or an average of £100 overpaid by each graduate). 
Summary 
Table 1 provides a summary of our estimates of the exchequer subsidy per £1 
loaned under each of the systems discussed above. As can be seen from the 
table, charging higher interest reduces the taxpayer subsidy and can, for 
sufficiently high interest rates, involve a taxpayer profit if other parameters 
and behaviour remain unchanged. We look at the issue of interest rates again 
in Section 4.4. 
Table 1. Subsidy/Profit per £1 of debt, increasing interest rates 
 Subsidy/Profit 
per £1 loaned 
Current system 23p 
2.2% interest rate 10p 
3.5% interest rate –0.2p 
 
4.2 Raising the tuition fee cap 
In 2006, a variable, deferred tuition fee was introduced, with the maximum 
fee capped at £3,000 in 2006 prices (or £3,200 at 2011 prices). In practice, 
almost all universities decided to charge students the maximum fee, and it is 
possible that the fee cap will be raised further in the future.  
Here, we assess the impact of possible increases in fees on government 
spending and on graduate repayments, under a range of different loan 
interest rates and under the assumption that fee loans would be extended to 
fully cover the increased fees.10 
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Figure 8 illustrates the government subsidy that would result at different 
average fee levels (we consider only the average fee level, since we have no 
way of systematically attributing differing fee levels that might be charged by 
universities to graduates earning different amounts). As it is possible that 
interest rates on loans would also be charged alongside a possible increase in 
the fee cap, the chart also shows how the subsidy would change at different 
levels of interest rates. 
Figure 8. Subsidy/Profit per student at different average fee levels and different interest 
rates 
 
 
In a system with zero real interest rates, an increase in fees would result in an 
increase in the taxpayer subsidy (this can be seen at the far left-hand side of 
Figure 8, where interest rates are zero). For example, if the fee cap were 
increased so that the average fee was £5,000, the government subsidy would 
go from £4,800 per graduate to £6,900 – a net cost of £2,100 per graduate. 
This arises both because of the interest subsidy and because of the debt write-
off – since the cost to the taxpayer of each of these increases with higher 
debt. Therefore, increasing the fee cap without altering the current 
repayment system would result in an increase in the costs of student support 
funded by the taxpayer.  
One way of reducing this cost would be to increase the interest rate on loans 
at the same time as increasing fees. The downward slope of the lines drawn in 
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Figure 8 highlights the fact that at each fee level, the taxpayer cost is lower 
the higher the interest rate charged. Under a £5,000 average fee, for example, 
it would require a 1.5% real interest rate to ensure that the taxpayer subsidy 
would not need to increase beyond the £4,800 subsidy implied by the current 
system.  
On the other hand, the interest rate required for the loan system to be 
revenue-neutral rises steeply with the level of the fee. For example, while the 
‘break-even’ real interest rate is 3.45% when the fee cap is £3,200, this rises to 
about 4% for an average fee level of £5,000 and to around 4.5% for an 
average fee level of £6,000.  
The interest rate required to break even rises so sharply with the level of the 
fee because of the escalating costs of debt write-off as fees rise. These in turn 
arise simply because an increasing number of graduates will reach the 25-year 
threshold without having paid off the full value of their loan. Any further 
increase in fees cannot increase the burden of payments to these graduates, 
and instead the taxpayer would effectively have to cover the entire additional 
cost. 
Table 2 summarises a few of the points from Figure 8, highlighting the 
government’s overall subsidy/profit under the current £3,200 fee cap and 
with an example £5,000 average fee level, at three different example real 
interest rates. 
Table 2. Average subsidy by fee level and interest rate 
 Real interest rate 
 0% 2.2% 3.5% 
£3,200 fee £4,800 £2,100 –£100 
£5,000 fee £6,900 £3,600 £1,100 
 
The table shows that if the government simply wanted to reduce the 
exchequer cost of the student support system, and was not concerned about 
raising any more money for the university sector, then its best course of 
action would be to keep the fee cap as it is and raise the interest rate – for 
example, to 3.5%. This example interest rate would result in a big saving 
compared with the current system and would result in a small overall profit of 
around £100 per student. Raising the average fee level to £5,000, even with a 
3.5% interest rate, would save the taxpayer money compared with the £4,800 
per student cost of the current system, but would still result in an overall net 
subsidy per student payable by the taxpayer of £1,100 per graduate.  
Figure 9 illustrates the distributional implications of increasing fees, showing 
an example average fee level of £5,000. We show this under two different 
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systems, one with a real interest rate on loans and one without. The chart 
highlights the fact that increasing fees would lead to a sharp increase in the 
government subsidy payable to the poorest graduates (particularly those in 
the lowest 10–15% of the graduate lifetime earnings distribution), even if a 
real interest rate were imposed. This is because the poorest graduates, who 
already benefit from debt write-off, would be fully protected from having to 
pay any more towards the cost of their university tuition if fees were to rise, 
and effectively the government would cover the full cost of the fee rise for 
these students. 
Figure 9. Average subsidy for a £5,000 fee, with and without a 2.2% interest rate 
 
 
Looking at the implications for graduates who do not fall into the poorest 
groups, Figure 9 shows that if no interest rate were charged, the level of 
subsidy payable to graduates above the poorest 10–15% would also rise, due 
to the interest subsidy arising from the zero real interest rate on the 
additional fee. However, the charging of a real interest rate of 2.2% in 
conjunction with a rise in fees to an average of £5,000 would imply a 
reduction in the graduate subsidy for all but the poorest quarter of graduates, 
compared with the current system.  
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In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we established that adding real interest rates to the 
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0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
S
u
b
si
d
y 
(£
)
Percentile of graduate lifetime earnings distribution
current system
5k fee, no interest rate
5k fee, 2.2% interest rate
Future arrangements for funding higher education 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
23 
However, this may not be the full story. In both cases, the cost of attending 
university would be significantly increased, and students and/or graduates 
may alter their behaviour in response. 
For example, in a system with a positive real interest rate, a graduate’s debt 
would increase each year by the amount of interest payable (less, obviously, 
any repayments made). It is therefore conceivable that, in the face of more 
costly debt, certain graduates might wish to make overpayments to their debt. 
Similarly, if the fee cap and accompanying loan were to be raised, graduates 
would face higher levels of debt and again may wish to make overpayments to 
reduce their loans faster.  
Furthermore, increasing the cost of attending university through charging 
interest rates on loans or by raising the fee cap may also dissuade certain 
students from taking out loans. Maintenance loan take-up is currently 80%, 
according to Student Loans Company statistics,11 while the take-up rate for 
fee loans is not publicly available. It is certainly the case that take-up could be 
reduced even further if the loans were made more expensive by charging real 
interest rates, though we do not know to what extent. The impact of such 
reduced take-up on the exchequer could be either positive or negative, 
depending on the future lifetime earnings paths of the students who decided 
not to take up the loans. 
Finally, increasing the cost of attending university may also affect an 
individual’s decision about whether to attend university at all. Recent IFS work 
suggests that an increase in up-front costs of higher education has a negative 
impact on participation12 (although no existing research, to our knowledge, 
tells us how responsive participation is to changes in deferred costs, assuming 
up-front costs remain unchanged). 
Policymakers need to be aware of all these important factors in their HE 
finance decision-making. 
4.4 Altering other parameters of the student loan system: the loan 
repayment rate, debt write-off and the repayment threshold 
As we have seen, raising the fee cap will cost money and charging interest will 
save money. We have also seen that it is possible to combine the two in 
various ways to save the government money. However, there are other 
parameters that the government could adjust to save money, including the 
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repayment rate (currently 9% of earnings above £15,000), the number of 
years after which debt is written off (currently 25 years) and/or the threshold 
at which people start repaying (currently £15,000). We consider each of these 
in turn.  
Changing the repayment rate  
With the current fee cap 
The first parameter we consider is the repayment rate. Figure 10 shows the 
distributional impact of raising the repayment rate from its current level of 9% 
of earnings above £15,000, to an example repayment rate of 15% of earnings 
above £15,000. 
Figure 10. Raising the repayment rate to 15% of earnings above £15,000 
 
 
In this example, the government subsidy per student would fall from its 
current level of £4,800 to £3,600 – or the subsidy per £1 loaned would fall 
from 23p to 17p. While this represents a significant saving of £1,200 per 
graduate, Figure 10 shows that this policy is quite regressive: the majority of 
savings would come from those graduates with earnings between the 5th and 
20th percentiles. 
This is because the impact of raising the repayment rate is simply to increase 
the speed at which repayments are made by all graduates earning above the 
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receive from holding their loans for longer, at the government’s expense. But 
those graduates who, under the old system, repaid only some of their loans 
before their debt was written off will now repay a larger proportion of their 
debt due to the increased rate of repayment.  
Those graduates who always earn less than the £15,000 threshold, however, 
will be protected against the repayment rate increase. 
Of course, the government may choose to set a lower repayment rate than 
15%, and may also combine this with a real interest rate. 
In Figure 11, we show various combinations of repayment rates and interest 
rates for different levels of government subsidy at the current fee of £3,200 
(2011 prices). This is similar to the analysis of ‘fiscal indifference curves’, 
constructed by Shephard (2010),13 although he used different debt 
parameters and earning assumptions.  
Figure 11. Fiscal indifference curves for current fee level 
 
Note: Dashed line represents interest rate of 2.2%, the government cost of borrowing. 
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As can be seen from the x marked on Figure 11, the current system involves 
an average taxpayer subsidy of £4,800 per student, a real interest rate of 0% 
and a repayment rate of 9%.  
Should the government wish to alter the repayment rate and/or the interest 
rate, a combination of these can be chosen which will either reduce costs or 
maintain the current level of subsidy.  
For example, the current £4,800 subsidy could be achieved by reducing the 
repayment rate to 6% and counteracting this with an increase in interest rates 
to 1.2%. Alternatively, the same subsidy could be achieved with an interest 
rate of 2% and a repayment rate of 5%.  
Alternatively, the government may wish to reduce the current subsidy. As we 
have previously discussed, the real interest rate required for the government 
to break even (i.e. pay out no overall subsidy) would be around 3.45% if the 
repayment rate remained unchanged at 9%. However, the interest rate would 
need to be raised to only 3.2% if the repayment rate were also raised to 11%, 
in order to break even. (This trade-off can be seen on the ‘no subsidy’ curve in 
Figure 11.)  
Or, if the government wanted to make a £2,000 per graduate profit, it could 
do so by lowering repayment rates to 8%, for example, and increasing interest 
rates to 4.8%, or by raising repayment rates to 13% with an interest rate of 
4.1%. 
Clearly, there are many different combinations of repayment rates and 
interest rates that can be combined to achieve the various targets. The 
distributional consequences of these different combinations of interest rates 
and repayment rates are very different. As Figure 10 illustrated, increasing the 
repayment rate is generally a regressive policy, which penalises lower-earning 
graduates more than higher-earning graduates, compared with the current 
system. In general, if the government wanted to reduce the taxpayer subsidy 
but maintain or improve the progressivity of the system, it could do so by 
imposing higher interest rates and lower repayment rates. (Of course, it could 
also improve the progressivity of the system by altering other parameters, 
such as the length of repayment in conjunction with an interest rate – as will 
be illustrated later in this section.) 
The varying progressivity of various options is highlighted in Table 3, which 
shows all the combinations of interest rates and repayment rates that give an 
overall zero per-student subsidy. The table also shows the subsidy at the 10th 
and 90th centiles of the earnings distribution as well as the mean (which is 
zero by construction). We can see that the combinations that give the biggest 
taxpayer subsidy to the lowest-earning graduates and take the highest ‘profit’ 
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from the highest earners are those that involve the highest interest rates and 
the lowest repayment rates. For a zero subsidy and of the combinations 
shown in Table 3, imposing a 5% real interest rate and a 5.8% repayment rate 
would give the biggest taxpayer subsidy to the lowest graduate earners. 
While Table 3 is constructed on the assumption that graduates do not change 
their repayment behaviour in response to different systems, it also highlights 
the fact that the higher the interest rate charged, the more likely it is that 
high-earning graduates would increase their repayment rate in order to 
reduce the ‘profit’ that the taxpayer will make from them. 
Table 3. Combinations of repayment rates and interest rates for zero government subsidy 
(at current fee levels) 
Subsidy at 10th 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Mean 
subsidy 
Subsidy at 90th 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Interest rate 
(%) 
Repayment rate 
(%) 
15,200 0 –10,200 5.0 5.8 
14,900 0 –9,400 4.8 6.0 
14,500 0 –8,500 4.6 6.2 
13,800 0 –7,300 4.3 6.6 
13,500 0 –6,900 4.2 6.8 
13,200 0 –6,400 4.1 7.0 
12,900 0 –6,000 4.0 7.2 
12,600 0 –5,600 3.9 7.4 
12,000 0 –5,200 3.8 7.8 
11,700 0 –4,800 3.7 8.0 
11,100 0 –4,400 3.6 8.4 
10,500 0 –4,000 3.5 8.8 
10,200 0 –4,000 3.5 9.0 
9,900 0 –3,700 3.4 9.2 
9,600 0 –3,700 3.4 9.4 
9,100 0 –3,300 3.3 9.8 
8,800 0 –3,300 3.3 10.0 
7,900 0 –2,900 3.2 10.6 
7,700 0 –2,900 3.2 10.8 
6,800 0 –2,600 3.1 11.4 
6,500 0 –2,500 3.1 11.6 
6,300 0 –2,500 3.1 11.8 
5,400 0 –2,200 3.0 12.4 
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With a £5,000 average fee 
In the Appendix, we carry out the same exercise but with an average fee of 
£5,000. As we showed in Section 4.2, under the current funding arrangements 
this involves a subsidy of £6,900, as putting up fees with no other changes 
(other than the extension of fee loans to cover the increase) increases 
exchequer costs. Since increasing the average fee raises government costs (as 
described in Section 4.2), it is always necessary to have higher interest rates 
and/or repayment rates to neutralise the cost to the exchequer. 
Also in the Appendix, we show the varying progressivity of combinations of 
interest rates and repayment rates with a £5,000 fee that lead to a zero per-
student subsidy (as in Table 3 for current fee levels) and those that lead to a 
£2,000 subsidy. 
Extending the debt write-off period 
Another option for reducing taxpayer costs and increasing graduate 
contributions is to extend the debt write-off period – for example, from 25 to 
30 years, as is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Figure 12. Extending the write-off period to 30 years 
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further 5 years. Better-off graduates who pay their debt off within 25 years 
are not affected by extending the debt write-off period – nor are those who 
earn below the threshold throughout their working lives, and therefore make 
no payments regardless of the debt write-off length. 
Again, extending the write-off could be done in combination with changes in 
interest rates and repayment rates; various combinations are shown in the 
Appendix. Extending the period of debt write-off allows slight reductions in 
interest rates or repayment rates for the same level of subsidy – but, as 
above, this is likely to hit lower earners the most. 
Extending the repayment period 
A somewhat similar scenario to increasing the debt write-off period is one 
that involves extending the repayment period for a set number of years after 
a graduate has repaid his/her loan,14 under a system of real interest rates.  
We illustrate this scenario by extending each graduate’s loan length by two 
years after their last repayment and adding a 2.2% real interest rate. 
However, the other parameters of the system remain unchanged – 25-year 
debt write-off, £15,000 repayment threshold and 9% repayment rate. 
The first panel of Figure 13 shows the system for men and women combined 
and also shows the current system with the addition of a 2.2% real interest 
rate. With the two-year extension, the exchequer gains 11p per £1 loaned 
(compared with a subsidy of 10p per £1 loaned under a system with a 2.2% 
interest rate). Therefore this system is profitable.  
But as Figure 13 also shows, this is quite a progressive scenario: the 
government only profits from graduates with earnings above the 25th 
percentile. Those earning less than the £15,000 threshold their whole lives will 
not make any additional payments under this new system; nor will those who 
do earn above the threshold, but reach the 25-year write-off period without 
fully repaying their debt. Those with earnings above the £15,000 threshold 
who manage to repay their debt within 25 years will make up to an additional 
two years of repayments (at 9% of earnings over £15,000). The additional 
repayments will average £4,600 per graduate making extra repayments. 
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Figure 13. Extending the repayment period by two years 
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Looking separately at men and women, it can be seen that the majority of 
profit made by the government from this system comes from male graduates: 
those from around the 5th percentile onwards repay more than their initial 
debt, and the resulting overall profit for the exchequer is 28p per £1 loaned. In 
contrast, only women with earnings at the 45th percentile onwards generate a 
profit for the exchequer, so the government continues to subsidise female 
graduates to the tune of 2p per £1 loaned. 
Changing the repayment threshold 
Finally, the last parameter that can be changed is the repayment threshold, 
which currently stands at £15,000 (in nominal terms) and from 2011 will be 
uprated with inflation. Reducing the threshold raises money for the exchequer 
but the savings are made disproportionately from the lowest graduate 
earners. This is because the pool of graduates repaying their loans each year is 
increased and now includes some very low-earning graduates (those who earn 
salaries between the new threshold and £15,000).  
4.5 Offering students an up-front discount 
So far, this report has concentrated on the impact of changing existing aspects 
of the student loans system. However, the government may also consider 
adding new features to the system. One example of this is offering borrowers 
a discount if they choose to repay part or all of their loan early.  
This policy is a current feature of the Australian HE loan system15 and has also 
been floated by the UK Conservative Party.16  
In the Australian system, students can make additional voluntary payments on their 
outstanding loan, and this will reduce their loan by an additional 10% of the extra payment 
(as long as this additional payment is over $500 or fully repays their loan if less than $500 
outstanding). For example, if they pay an additional $1,000 off their loan, they will reduce 
their outstanding loan by $1,100. In Australia, students who take out a fee loan incur a loan 
fee of 20% (in effect, this implies an approximate 20% discount for paying up front). This is 
planned to increase to 25% from 1 July 2010 – see 
http://www.goingtouni.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/76263DB4-71C5-478D-A448-
DAD447B60269/0/FEEHELP2010booklet_Nov09.pdf for more details. Outstanding loans are 
only uprated by inflation.
The Conservative Party has suggested a 10% discount for existing loanholders only, for an 
initial period of three years. Under this scheme, graduates would be given a 10% discount 
for early repayments over £500 and for up-front repayment of their loans. (See 
http://www.davidwilletts.co.uk/2009/10/05/conservatives-will-provide-an-extra-10000-
university-places-next-year/.) As this report and our data are based on new-entry students, 
we are unable to model this policy option specifically.
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In order for a system such as this to be profitable for the exchequer, however, 
graduates would have to repay more than under a system without the 
discount.  
But if only those graduates who stand to benefit from the discount took 
advantage of it, the government would make a loss (clearly this must be the 
case, since any gain to graduates is a loss to the exchequer). While this policy 
would then free up money in the short term by bringing forward graduate 
repayment streams that otherwise would occur a long time in the future, it 
would do so at an overall long-term cost to the public finances.  
If the policy is to be genuinely profitable, it relies on graduates voluntarily 
giving up some of the subsidies they are entitled to, for no financial gain 
(indeed, for a loss). 
Evidence from Australia17 suggests that many graduates, and parents on their 
behalf, are indeed prepared to do this. However, the policy’s profitability 
relies on students not choosing the best long-term option for them (which 
depends on future lifetime earnings) and/or their lack of knowledge about the 
HE system.  
5. The balance between public and private contributions 
While this report has primarily concentrated on the possible savings for or 
costs to the exchequer, and the distributional effects for graduates of various 
policy options, it is illuminating to consider how each of these groups as a 
whole, as well as taxpayers and universities, is affected by the reforms. 
In this section, we illustrate this by means of circular flows of payments. This 
shows the net payments to and receipts from the different participants within 
the HE system: universities, students, graduates and taxpayers. Accounting for 
both where payments come from and where they go to results in a zero-sum. 
Comparing such zero-sums across different systems gives us a clear indication 
of the net contributors and receivers from each of the scenarios.  
Tables 4–6 set out our calculations of the net balance of payments (negative 
in the tables) and receipts (positive in the tables) between different groups in 
the current system of higher education in funding in England, and under our 
two main scenarios of adding a real interest rate of 2.2% and of increasing the 
average fee to £5,000, and also a combination of the two. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/higher/should-we-
follow-the-kiwis-and-offer-discounts-for-graduates-who-pay-off-their-student-loans-early-
1932332.html
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In each case, as well as considering the loans system, we consider 
maintenance grants paid to students and the full value of the grants paid from 
central government to universities for undergraduate teaching, which are 
channelled through HEFCE. The figures are constructed as follows:  
 taxpayers – pay out HEFCE money,18 maintenance grants, and fee and 
maintenance loan subsidies; 
 students – receive maintenance grants and loans; 
 graduates – pay fee and maintenance loans (less loan subsidies); 
 universities – receive HEFCE and tuition fee money.19 
Adding a real interest rate of 2.2% 
Looking first at Table 4, the first column shows the current system. Here, 
universities received about £7,800 per student funding for teaching, coming 
mainly from taxpayers (via direct payments to universities in the form of the 
recurrent teaching grant made to HEFCE each year – amounting to £4,600 per 
student per year), and also from graduates (via deferred fees). Graduates 
make a net contribution, from maintenance and fee loan repayments (less the 
taxpayer subsidy, or unpaid part of the loan). Students receive £5,000 each on 
average, from maintenance grants and loans.  
Table 4. Circular flows of payments, current system and system with 2.2% real interest 
rate (£ per year of study) 
 
CURRENT 
2009–10 system 
NEW 
2.2% interest rate 
system 
New system 
compared with 
current system 
Taxpayers –7,400 –6,500 +900 
Students +5,000 +5,000 0 
Graduates –5,400 –6,300 –900 
Universities +7,800 +7,800 0 
Sums of gains and losses £0 £0 £0 
 
The second column of the table shows that taxpayers are made better off 
under a 2.2% real interest rate, with the average taxpayer subsidy falling to 
£6,500. Graduates, meanwhile, are worse off since they now have to pay 
interest on their loans. 
The final column of Table 4 allows us to understand the net impact of all these 
changes: the taxpayer saves £900 per student per year (from reducing the 
loan subsidy), while graduates each lose £900 per year (from increased loan 
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repayments). This scenario does not affect student or university costs / 
income since they gain or lose nothing from the rise in interest rates. 
Increasing the average fee to £5,000 
Table 5 considers the circular flow of payments arising from increasing the 
average fee level to £5,000. 
Table 5. Circular flows of payments, current system and system with £5,000 average 
tuition fee (£ per year of study) 
 CURRENT 
2009–10 system 
NEW 
£5k average fee 
system 
New system 
compared with 
current system 
Taxpayers –7,400 –8,100 –700 
Students +5,000 +5,000 0 
Graduates –5,400 –6,500 –1,100 
Universities +7,800 +9,600 +1,800 
Sums of gains and losses £0 £0 £0 
 
In this case, universities gain £1,800 per student, due to the increase in tuition 
fee payments of £1,800 per year (this represents the increase from the 
current fee level of £3,200 at 2011 prices, to £5,000). Students are unaffected 
by the reform since we have assumed that the fee increase will be fully 
covered by a loan. Graduates, meanwhile, increase their contribution by 
£1,100 per year of study – £3,300 in total, representing the increase in debt 
repayments. Taxpayers also make an increased contribution of £700 per 
person per year of study in the form of the increase in graduate subsidy 
arising from the fee increase. 
Adding a real interest rate of 2.2% and increasing the average fee to £5,000 
Finally, in Table 6, we consider the flow of payments arising from charging a 
2.2% interest rate and increasing the average fee to £5,000. 
Table 6. Circular flows of payments, current system and system with 2.2% real interest 
rate and £5,000 average tuition fee (£ per year of study) 
 CURRENT 
2009–10 system 
NEW 
2.2% interest rate + 
£5k fee system 
New system 
compared with 
current system 
Taxpayers –7,400 –7,000 +400 
Students +5,000 +5,000 0 
Graduates –5,400 –7,600 –2,200 
Universities +7,800 +9,600 +1,800 
Sums of gains and losses £0 £0 £0 
 
In this instance, again universities gain £1,800 from the increase in fee 
revenue. But now the taxpayer also makes a small net gain, of £400 per 
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student per year (since the subsidy falls by £1,200 from £4,800 to £3,600 over 
three years, or £400 per year – see Table 2). The biggest losers in this scenario 
are graduates, who must increase their contribution by £2,200 per year, in the 
form of increased loan repayments. 
6. Conclusions 
The options for funding higher education are complex. There are many 
choices available to the government, depending on what its key objectives 
are. In this paper, we have attempted to highlight some of the trade-offs that 
are involved in a wide range of possible reforms.  
Our analysis shows, in summary, that: 
 Under our simulations, the current maintenance and fee loan system 
results in an average taxpayer subsidy of 23p for every £1 loaned to a 
student. Given an average debt level for a graduate of a three-year 
undergraduate degree of £20,900, this amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of 
£4,800 per graduate who takes out a loan.  
 Charging an interest rate on loans saves the taxpayer money – for 
example, a 2.2% interest rate reduces the taxpayer subsidy to 10p for 
every £1 loaned, and if the government charged an interest rate of 3.45% 
there would be no subsidy (assuming no behavioural change).  
 Charging a positive real interest rate generates slightly more savings from 
male and female graduates in the middle of the lifetime earnings 
distribution than from those at either the bottom or the top. This is 
because these graduates do not benefit from the debt write-off subsidy, 
but benefit most from the interest subsidy.  
 Increasing the fee cap costs the taxpayer money (assuming that fee loans 
would be extended to cover the increased fees), but this cost can be 
reduced by increasing interest rates in conjunction with increasing fees. 
Under a £5,000 average fee, for example, if a 1.5% real interest rate were 
charged, then the taxpayer subsidy would not need to increase beyond the 
£4,800 subsidy implied by the current system. A further consequence of 
raising fees is that it may result in a decrease in university participation.  
 Other parameters of the loan system can be adjusted to achieve the same 
subsidy as the current system or a lower one – changes can be made, for 
example, to the repayment rate, the number of years after which debt is 
written off or the threshold at which people start repaying. However, it is 
vital to consider the distributional consequences for different types of 
graduates. For instance, increasing the debt write-off period would result 
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in all exchequer gains being made from relatively poor graduates; reducing 
the repayment threshold would result in savings for the government, but is 
also regressive.  
 Different interest rates and repayment rates can also be combined to 
produce subsidies as desired – but also, crucially, to improve the 
progressivity of the system. For example, a zero subsidy could be achieved 
by imposing an interest rate of 3.45% if the repayment rate remained 
unchanged at 9%. However, imposing a 5% real interest rate and a 5.8% 
repayment rate would still achieve a zero subsidy but would give the 
biggest taxpayer subsidy to the lowest graduate earners. Other progressive 
options include lengthening the repayment period for a further two years 
after graduates have paid off their loans.  
 Alternatively, the government could introduce new features to the system, 
such as up-front discounts. However, in order to make money from such 
discounts, it needs to induce graduates who would lose out from taking 
the discount to actually take it up.  
 Finally, increasing the cost of attending university may result in 
behavioural changes by both students and graduates, which may be 
difficult to predict.  
Appendix 
Alternative earnings growth scenarios 
The results in this report are mainly based on a central scenario of earnings level and 
growth, but we also have results under an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario. 
The assumptions made under each scenario are as follows: 
• Central scenario (as used in the main body of this report):  
– 4.5% fall in earnings over 2007–10 relative to trend, which implies growth of 
1.8% per year between 2008 and 2014  
– long-term average earnings growth at 2% per year from 2014 
• Optimistic scenario:  
– 4.5% fall in earnings over 2007–10 relative to trend, which implies growth of 
1.8% per year between 2008 and 2014 
– long-term average earnings growth at 2.25% per year from 2014 
• Pessimistic scenario: 
– 10% fall in earnings over 2007–10 relative to trend, which implies growth of 
0.7% per year between 2008 and 2014 
– long-term average earnings growth at 1.75% per year from 2014 
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These are based on the detailed macroeconomic forecasts contained in the IFS 
Green Budget 2010.20 
Figures 14–16 illustrate the net present value of repayments, the subsidy as a 
percentage of the original loan, and the number of years taken to repay the loan 
under our alternative earnings growth scenarios. 
Figure 14. Net present value of repayments per graduate, alternative earnings growth 
scenarios 
 
 
Figure 15. Subsidy as a percentage of loan, alternative earnings growth scenarios 
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Figure 16. Years to repay loan, alternative earnings growth scenarios 
 
 
Altering other parameters of the student loan system 
A £5,000 fee 
Figure 17 shows the various combinations of interest rates and repayment rates for 
different levels of government subsidy with a £5,000 fee level. If the government 
wanted to keep the taxpayer subsidy at current levels (of £4,800), then it is clear 
from the chart that with a repayment rate of between 5% and 15%, the government 
will need to introduce a real interest rate on loans (the £4,800 subsidy indifference 
curve never crosses the zero real interest rate level at repayment rates between 5% 
and 15%).  
To reduce the government subsidy, other combinations will need to be found. For 
instance, if the government subsidy were reduced to £2,000 per student, then the 
current repayment rate of 9% would need an interest rate of 3.1%. This would 
involve a subsidy of £15,800 to those in the bottom 10% of the lifetime earnings 
distribution and a £3,500 ‘profit’ taken from those in the top 10% of the lifetime 
earnings distribution. An interest rate of 2.2% and a repayment rate of 11.6% would 
involve no taxpayer subsidy for the top 10% of lifetime earners and an £11,800 
subsidy for the lowest 10% of lifetime earners.  
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Figure 17. Fiscal indifference curves for £5,000 fee 
 
Notes: Dashed line represents interest rate of 2.2%, the government cost of borrowing. 
‘Current system’ refers to current interest and repayment rates. 
 
The varying progressivity of various options of interest rates and repayment rates is 
illustrated in Tables 7 and 8, which show (in Table 7) various combinations of interest 
rates and repayment rates that give an overall zero per-student subsidy and (in Table 
8) various combinations that give a £2,000 subsidy. Like Table 3, these tables also 
show the subsidy at the 10th and 90th centiles of the earnings distribution as well as 
at the mean (which is zero in Table 7 and 2,000 in Table 8, by construction).  
For example, in Table 7, the combination of interest rate and repayment rate that 
would provide a cost-neutral system and the biggest subsidy for low-earning 
graduates is an interest rate of 4.8% and a repayment rate of 7.6%. Under the 
current repayment rate of 9%, interest rates would have to be set around 4% to 
achieve a cost-neutral system. 
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Table 7. Combinations of repayment rates and interest rates for zero government subsidy 
(with £5,000 average fee) 
Subsidy at 10
th
 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Mean 
subsidy 
Subsidy at 90
th
 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Interest rate 
(%) 
Repayment rate 
(%) 
18,700 0 –11,800 4.8 7.6 
18,300 0 –10,800 4.6 7.8 
18,000 0 –10,200 4.5 8.0 
17,700 0 –9,700 4.4 8.2 
17,300 0 –9,200 4.3 8.4 
17,000 0 –8,600 4.2 8.6 
16,700 0 –8,100 4.1 8.8 
15,800 0 –7,100 3.9 9.4 
15,200 0 –6,600 3.8 9.8 
14,600 0 –6,100 3.7 10.2 
14,000 0 –5,600 3.6 10.6 
13,100 0 –5,100 3.5 11.2 
12,200 0 –4,600 3.4 11.8 
11,100 0 –4,100 3.3 12.6 
11,400 0 –4,100 3.3 12.4 
9,700 0 –3,700 3.2 13.6 
9,900 0 –3,700 3.2 13.4 
8,000 0 –3,200 3.1 14.8 
8,300 0 –3,200 3.1 14.6 
8,500 0 –3,200 3.1 14.4 
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Table 8. Combinations of repayment rates and interest rates for £2,000 government 
subsidy (with £5,000 average fee) 
Subsidy at 10
th
 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Mean 
subsidy 
Subsidy at 90
th
 
centile 
of lifetime 
earnings 
distribution 
Interest rate 
(%) 
Repayment rate 
(%) 
19,500 2,000 –9,200 4.3 6.8 
19,100 2,000 –8,200 4.1 7.0 
18,400 2,000 –6,800 3.8 7.4 
16,800 2,000 –4,400 3.3 8.4 
16,400 2,000 –4,000 3.2 8.6 
15,500 2,000 –3,100 3.0 9.2 
14,900 2,000 –2,600 2.9 9.6 
14,300 2,000 –2,200 2.8 10.0 
13,700 2,000 –1,800 2.7 10.4 
13,100 2,000 –1,400 2.6 10.8 
12,300 2,000 –1,100 2.5 11.4 
11,100 2,000 –700 2.4 12.2 
11,400 2,000 –700 2.4 12.0 
10,300 2,000 –300 2.3 12.8 
10,500 2,000 –300 2.3 12.6 
8,900 2,000 0 2.2 13.8 
9,100 2,000 0 2.2 13.6 
9,400 2,000 0 2.2 13.4 
7,700 2,000 200 2.1 14.6 
8,000 2,000 200 2.1 14.4 
 
Extending the write-off period to 30 years 
If the write-off period were extended to 30 years, the current £4,800 subsidy could 
be achieved by lowering the repayment rate to 8%, or by reducing it even further 
and raising interest rates. Figure 18 also shows other, less costly, options. 
Future arrangements for funding higher education 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010 
42 
Figure 18. Fiscal indifference curves for 30-year write-off of outstanding debt 
 
Notes: Dashed line represents interest rate of 2.2%, the government cost of borrowing. ‘Current 
system’ refers to current interest and repayment rates. 
 
Technical appendix 
Construction of simulated lifetime earnings profiles 
Overview 
Our simulated lifetime earnings profiles are constructed as follows. We start by using 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to estimate a rich statistical model for the 
dynamics of log annual earnings. We then estimate three models of annual 
employment dynamics, also using the BHPS. These models jointly determine a 
dynamic process that determines the probability of exiting employment, the 
probability of re-entering employment after a spell of non-employment and the 
annual earnings of re-employed individuals. Next we simulate a large number of 
individual paths from these estimated earnings and employment models. Finally, we 
adjust the simulations to be consistent with the age-specific cross-sectional 
distributions of earnings for employed individuals in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
To do this, we transform the simulated cross-sectional distributions of non-zero 
earnings so that each percentile of the simulated distribution coincides with the 
corresponding percentile from the LFS at the relevant age. 
The final simulations can thus be thought of as a hybrid model that features earnings 
and employment dynamics from the BHPS, but with cross-sectional earnings 
distributions (and levels) that are consistent with the LFS. 
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Data issues 
BHPS: sample selection 
We define each individual’s education level as the highest attained level by age 22. In 
addition, we include as graduates any individuals who attained their degree at age 
23. We include all graduates in the sample from ages 22 to 60. Our data are from the 
first 16 waves of the BHPS, covering the years 1991 to 2006. 
BHPS: definition of earnings 
Annual earnings are defined as annual labour income in the reference year from 
September in the year prior to the interview until September in the year in which 
interviewing begins. All earnings are expressed in 2011 pounds with uprating 
according to the retail price index (all items).21 We treat observations with annual 
earnings below £1,000 as zero annual earnings. 
LFS: sample selection 
We define each individual’s education level as the highest attained level by age 22. 
We include all graduates in the sample from ages 22 to 60. Our data are quarterly, 
from 1993Q1 to 2009Q2. 
LFS: definition of earnings 
Annual earnings are defined as gross weekly pay in main job, multiplied by 52. All 
earnings are expressed in 2011 pounds with uprating according to the retail price 
index (all items).22 We treat observations with annual earnings below £1,000 as zero 
annual earnings. 
Model for log annual earnings 
Let Yiat be annual earnings for individual i at age a in year t. For individuals with non-
zero annual earnings, let yiat = log Yiat be log annual earnings. We assume the 
following statistical process for yiat: 
 ˆiat iat iaty X y  
 ˆiat i i iat iaty a u z  
 , 1, 1iat iat i a tu  
 , 1, 1iat i a t iatz z  
 0 0i tz  
 0 0i t  
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All shocks are assumed to follow normal distributions: 
 
2
,~ 0,i aN  
 
2
,~ 0,i aN  
 
2
,~ 0,iat aN  
 
2
,~ 0,iat aN  
Xiat is a vector of observable characteristics for individual i that include a quartic 
polynomial in age, a full set of year dummies, and dummies for region and ethnicity. 
αi is an individual-specific fixed effect and γi is an individual-specific deterministic 
linear trend in age. Together, αi and γi allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity in both 
the level and age-profile of the deterministic component of earnings. The 
idiosyncratic stochastic component comprises two parts: ziat is a first-order auto-
regressive persistent shock and uiat is a first-order moving-average transitory shock. 
We allow the variances of both shocks, 
2
,a  and 
2
,a , to be quadratic functions of 
age, and the auto-regressive parameter, ρ, to be a cubic function of age. The moving-
average parameter, θ, is assumed to be fixed across ages. 
The model parameters are estimated separately for male and for female graduates 
using the BHPS sample described above. Estimation takes place in three stages: 
1. Regress log earnings on the observed characteristics Xiat and store the 
residuals as ˆiaty . 
2. Calculate the sample auto-covariance function of the residuals ˆiaty  at each 
age for up to 10 lags. This generates a set of estimated auto-covariances, 
ˆ ˆ ˆcov ,a a dy y for d = 0,...,10. 
3. Choose the parameters of the earnings model to minimise the distance 
between the sample auto-covariance function and the theoretical auto-
covariance function implied by the model. Each element of the auto-
covariance function is weighted by 
0.5
,a dn , where na,d is the number of 
observations that were used in the construction of the sample auto-
covariance at age a and lag d. In total, 374 moments were used in the 
estimation. 
Models for annual employment 
We define an individual to be non-employed in year t if they are observed to have 
annual earnings less than £1,000 in that year. We estimate three models for 
employment dynamics: the probability of moving from employment to non-
employment, the probability of moving from non-employment to employment, and 
the annual earnings of re-employed workers. 
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Entry to employment 
The probability of a previously non-employed worker becoming employed is 
assumed to be a probit model with age and duration of non-employment as 
independent variables. Age enters as a quartic polynomial. Duration enters as 
dummy variables for one year, two years and more than two years. 
Exit to non-employment 
The probability of a currently employed worker becoming non-employed is assumed 
to be a probit model with age and log earnings as independent variables. Age enters 
as a quartic polynomial. Log earnings enter as a quadratic polynomial. 
Re-entry earnings 
Log earnings of a previously non-employed worker are assumed to be a function of 
age, duration non-employed and last log annual earnings before becoming non-
employed. Age enters as a quartic polynomial, duration enters as dummy variables 
for one year and more than one year, and last log annual earnings enter linearly. 
Simulating the BHPS model for earnings and employment 
The estimated earnings and employment models are simulated alongside each 
other, using the simulated earnings as inputs to determine the probability of 
becoming non-employed and the re-entry earnings upon re-employment. The only 
thing that remains to be specified is how the stochastic component of earnings upon 
re-employment is divided between the persistent and transitory components. This is 
done differently for males and females. For males, it is assumed that the transitory 
component is equal to the stochastic component of the re-entry earnings equation; 
the persistent component is equal to the remainder. For females, it is assumed that 
the persistent component is a weighted average of the persistent component as just 
described for males, and a random draw from the unconditional distribution of the 
persistent component (assuming full employment) at the relevant age; the weights 
used are 0.35 on the former and 0.65 on the latter. These specifications were chosen 
because they were found to generate employment patterns and re-entry earnings 
distributions that match the BHPS well at each age. 
To generate a simulated series for raw earnings from the simulated series for logs, 
we first add back the estimated quartic age profile from the first-stage regression. 
Next we randomly assign each simulated individual to a region / ethnicity group, 
according to the observed region / ethnicity distribution. We then add back the 
relevant region / ethnicity constants. Finally, we add back the intercept term that 
corresponds to the year effect for the most recent year (2006) and exponentiate log 
earnings to obtain raw earnings. 
Adjusting for consistency with the LFS 
The final step is to adjust the cross-sectional distributions of non-zero earnings to be 
consistent with the observed cross-sectional distributions of non-zero earnings in the 
LFS. To do this, we calculate the following percentiles of the log-earnings distribution 
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in the LFS at each age: 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 
95 99. Each percentile is smoothed across ages using a five-point moving average. 
For each simulated log-earnings realisation, we calculate its rank in the simulated 
distribution at that age. We then re-assign it the corresponding log earnings from the 
smoothed percentiles in the LFS, using linear interpolation to evaluate ranks that lie 
between the percentiles listed above. 
Two things should be noted. First, non-employed simulations (i.e. those with zero 
earnings) are not affected by this transformation; hence, the fraction of people 
employed at each age is left unchanged. Second, since annual earnings in the LFS are 
calculated as weekly earnings multiplied by 52, it is likely that the LFS overstates 
earnings in the bottom parts of the distribution, due to the presence of part-year 
workers. 
Comparison with previous work 
In previous work, we used the cross-sectional earnings distributions from the LFS to 
estimate age-specific marginal distributions of earnings. We then modelled the two-
year dependence structure in earnings as a bivariate t-copula, which we estimated 
using the small two-year panel dimension of the LFS. One problem with this 
approach is that it forces earnings to be a first-order Markov process. This is 
inconsistent with a large literature on modelling earnings dynamics, which shows 
that there are important longer-run correlations in individual earnings. Importantly, 
our previous model abstracted from unobserved fixed effects, highly persistent 
shocks to earnings and also purely transitory earnings shocks. 
Our new approach maintains the philosophy of using the larger cross-sectional LFS 
samples to estimate cross-sectional distributions and the smaller panel surveys to 
estimate dependence. However, we now allow the dynamic process to be 
characterised by fixed effects, persistent shocks and transitory shocks; this generates 
dynamic properties for earnings that better reflect the earnings fluctuations that 
workers experience over their careers. Since the model allows for non-parametric 
estimation of marginal earnings distributions, the resulting process for log earnings is 
not a linear Gaussian process (as in most of the literature). However, the 
dependence structure implicit in our simulations is consistent with a multi-
dimensional Gaussian copula. In this limited sense, the model is more restrictive 
than our earlier one (which was based on a bivariate t-copula). However, the current 
model is far more general in that it relaxes the first-order Markov assumption. We 
view this as a big advantage over our previous work. 
